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AMERICAN PUNITIVE DAMAGES VS.
COMPENSATORY DAMAGES IN
PROMOTING ENFORCEMENT IN
DEMOCRACTIC NATIONS OF CIVIL
JUDGMENTS TO DETER STATE-SPONSORS
OF TERRORISM
JEFFREY F. ADDICOTT*

I. INTRODUCTION
―There is considerable reason to believe that the civil justice
system has substantial, underutilized potential in the war
against terrorism.‖1
John Norton Moore
The central consequence of the 2001 al-Qa‘eda terror
attack2 on the United States of America was a fundamental
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1
JOHN NORTON MOORE, Introduction, in CIVIL LITIGATION AGAINST
TERRORISM 3, 5 (John Norton Moore ed., Carolina Academic Press 2004).
2
U.S. H. PERMANENT SELECT COMM., AL-QAEDA: THE MANY
FACES OF AN ISLAMIST EXTREMIST THREAT, H.R. REP. No. 109-615, at 8
(2006). Al-Qaeda finds its roots in the Salafi tradition, which is based on
the extreme interpretation of Sunni Islam. Id. ―Salafism is rooted in the
belief that the Koran and the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad and his
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legal shift in the approach that the United States and, to a
lesser degree, other democratic nations3 have taken in regard
to confronting international terrorism and the States that
support terrorism.4 Damaged was the old law enforcement
paradigm of pre-9/11 which emphasized international treaties
focused entirely on criminalizing specific acts of terror by
specific individuals.5 The new challenge of the post-9/11
companions are the most legitimate sources of religious conduct and
reasoning, and as such should be emulated and put into practice in
contemporary Islamic communities.‖ Id. Al-Qaeda has used this distorted
interpretation of Salafi Islam to attract thousands of Muslims around the
world to wage a war against the United States and the West. Id.
3
Democracy‘s Decline: Crying for Freedom, ECONOMIST, Jan. 16,
2010, at 58-60. According to the lobby group Freedom House, the number
of electoral democracies in the world stands at 116 out of the 192 nations
in the United Nations. Id.
4
JEFFREY F. ADDICOTT, TERRORISM LAW: MATERIALS, CASES,
COMMENTS 19-54 (5th ed., Lawyers & Judges Publishing Co. 2009)
(describing the concept of the ―War on Terror‖ and how America has
shifted to the law of war in dealing with the radical al-Qa‘eda group).
5
Id. at 59.
Some examples of specific antiterrorist conventions
include: The Convention on Offenses and Certain Other
Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (Tokyo Convention,
1963); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft (Hague Convention, 1971);
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Montreal
Convention, 1973); Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected
Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents (New York
Convention, 1976-1977); and the International
Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (Hostages
Convention, 1979). Id. International Convention for
the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997);
International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism (1999);
International
Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear
Terrorism New York (2005); Convention on the
Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of
Detection (1991); Protocol for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms
Located on the Continental Shelf (1988); Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety

2010 Civil Judgments to Deter State Terrorism Sponsors

91

approach focuses on ways to effectively combat not only the
al-Qa‘eda-styled Islamic terrorists and groups, but the States
that provide sponsorship or support to all forms of
international terrorism, particularly the mega-Islamic terror
groups.6 Apart from activities associated with killing,
detaining, or prosecuting individual terrorists—whether they
are labeled as enemy combatants or not7—this new thinking
also demands the acceptance by fellow democracies of an
internationally based functional legal methodology that can
deter those rogue States that sponsor terrorism, like Iran, ab
initio.8
In the United States, the new thinking by both the
Executive and Congress encompassed the employment of a
―law of war‖ model against a specific terror group—alQa‘eda and their supporters, the Taliban. This model used the

of Maritime Navigation (1988); Protocol on the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports
Serving International Civil Aviation (1988); Convention
on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (1980);
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
against the Safety of Civil Aviation (1971).
U.N.T.S., Text and Status of the United Nations Convention on Terrorism,
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/DB.aspx?path=DB/studies/page2_en.xml&me
nu=MTDSG (last visited June 10, 2010).
6
U.S. Dep‘t of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism,
Foreign Terrorist Organizations (Jan. 19, 2010), available at
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm. Hamas and Hezbollah
have long been on the State Department‘s list of terror organizations. Id.
7
Jeffrey F. Addicott, Efficacy of the Obama Policies to Combat AlQa‘eda, the Taliban, and Associated Forces—The First Year, 30 PACE L.
REV. 340, 350 (2010). The term ―War on Terror‖ was used by the Bush
Administration to describe the ongoing international armed conflict
between the United States of America and the ―Taliban, al-Qa‘eda, or
associated forces.‖ Id. at 345-46. The Obama Administration generally
refuses to use the term ―War on Terror‖ but operates under the same legal
authorities.‖ Id. at 353.
8
Debra M. Strauss, Reaching Out to the International Community:
Civil Lawsuits as the Common Ground in the Battle Against Terrorism,
19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 307 (2009) (arguing for a new legal
framework to combat terrorism based on civil litigation).
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more robust tool of military force9 against all those ―nations,
organizations, or persons‖10 that the President determined had
―planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks‖11 against the United States on September 11, 2001.
While other States around the world did not use a law of war
model to deal with al-Qa‘eda or similar terror groups, the rise
of the mega-Islamic terror groups did prompt them to alter
their domestic criminal statutes. England, for example,
amended its criminal code to allow for the detention of
suspected ―terrorists‖ for up to 28 days without bringing
criminal charges.12 This was done to provide law
enforcement the legal right to stop and hold those suspected
of planning a terror plot even if the hard evidence was
lacking at the time of detention.
Although much has been written on the legal and policy
issues surrounding the use of the law of war as a legitimate
tool against certain terror groups, perhaps the best weapon
against international terrorism, civil litigation against the
State that sponsors or supports terrorism is still an emerging
concept.13 Given the fact that large scale terror groups like
9

Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat.
2600 (2006). ―An Act to authorize trial by military commission for
violations of the law of war, and for other purposes.‖ Id. The United
States also used other law of war tools such as trial by military
commissions to prosecute alleged war criminals associated with al-Qa‘eda
and Taliban forces for violations of the law of war. Id. at 2601. See also
Military Commissions Act of 2009, H.R. REP. NO. 2647-385, at 386
(2009).
10
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115
Stat. 224 (2001).
11
Id.
12
Terrorism Act 2006 (U.K.), available at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2006/ukpga_20060011_en_1. ―An Act
to make provision for and about offences relating to conduct carried out,
or capable of being carried out, for purposes connected with terrorism; to
amend enactments relating to terrorism; to amend the Intelligence
Services Act 1994 and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000;
and for connected purposes.‖ Id.
13
Jack D. Smith & Gregory J. Cooper, Disrupting Terrorist
Financing with Civil Litigation, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT‘L L. 65 (2009)
(discussing the development of the concept of civil litigation and the
promise of disrupting terrorism).
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Hezbollah, al-Qa‘eda, or Hamas cannot operate effectively
without State sponsorship, the purpose of this article is to
discuss the acceptance by the world‘s democratic nations of
this potentially superlative legal tool which could be used
with great effect not only to deter the terrorism, but to totally
eviscerate many of the most visible terror groups such as
Hamas and Hezbollah. In other words, apart from what any
particular State may or may not do to address terrorism as a
criminal or law of war issue, one response that the terrorist
group and, more importantly, the State that sponsors or
supports the terrorist group, will always understand is
targeting and draining its financial assets. Recognizing that
the ―democracies of the world are financial and economic
superpowers‖14 that actually control large chunks of
economic capital from all nations, a legal avenue for victims
of terror to receive compensation via civil litigation would
serve as a vital and necessary means to deny resources to
terrorist organizations and at the same time punish the Statesponsor. Such a legal tool would certainly act as a powerful
deterrence against those nations who sponsor terrorist groups
by making it ―unprofitable to engage in support of terrorist
activities.‖15
Unfortunately, while the United States has established
several legal avenues for civil litigation by private citizens of
terror attacks against States that sponsor terrorism, a major
stumbling block in terms of effectiveness rests in the reality
that fellow democratic nations in the international community
refuse to honor or domesticate the monetary judgments of
American courts. Acknowledging that there are a plethora of
political and legal obstacles associated with establishing a
workable mechanism for fellow democracies to enforce the
―terror‖ judgments of American courts, one reason that is
often raised by critics is the strong objection to the matter of
14

JOHN NORTON MOORE, Civil Litigation Against Terrorism:
Neglected Promise, in LEGAL ISSUES IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST TERROR
197, 200 (John Norton Moore & Robert F. Turner eds., Carolina
Academic Press 2010).
15
JOHN F. MURPHY, Civil Lawsuits as a Legal Response to
International Terrorism, in CIVIL LITIGATION AGAINST TERRORISM 37, 61
(John Norton Moore ed., Carolina Academic Press 2004).
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American punitive monetary awards, a concept that is
rejected by most of the world‘s democratic legal systems. The
answer to the aversion towards punitive damages can be
remedied by substituting the more widespread acceptance of
compensatory damages. Accordingly, any future effort to
establish a legal framework to energize democracies to
enforce American judgments should be predicated solely on
compensation. Hopefully, as more nations come to
understand the American concept of just compensation, the
establishment of a viable international agreement will occur.
II. TERRORISM
It is sometimes said that terrorism is a mindless and
irrational activity. This conclusion is absolutely false. The
reality of modern terrorism is the exact opposite. Terrorism
is the premeditated use of unlawful violence calculated to, as
the old Chinese saw relates, ―kill one and frighten ten
thousand.‖16 Unfortunately, all too often, this strategy of
intimidation, death, and resulting fear used by the terrorists
pays off when those who are attacked are perceived as
capitulating to the terrorists‘ demands. The outcome of the
elections in Spain following the 2004 train bombings in
Madrid is a clear example of how the actions of terrorists can
cause the citizens of a target nation to acquiesce to the
demands of terrorists.17
Perhaps the greatest inadequacy of the international
community in terms of dealing with terrorism rests in an
inability to agree as to what constitutes terrorism. Radical
Islamic terrorism is a global problem and yet the international
community has been absolutely unable to adopt an accepted
international definition of terrorism. Even the former
Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan‘s, 2005
definition was rejected because a large block of Islamic

16

See SUN-TZU, THE ART OF WAR (Ralph D. Sawyer, trans., 1994).
Human Rights Watch, Setting an Example? Counter-Terrorism
Measures in Spain, 16–17, available at
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2005/01/26/setting-example-0 (2005).
17
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nations wanted an exception for wars of national liberation.18
Ignoring the ―cause,‖ Annan‘s entirely reasonable definition
echoed the Geneva Conventions‘19 definition of a war crime.
“[A]ny action constitutes terrorism if it is intended to cause
death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants,
with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a
Government or an international organization to do or abstain
from doing any act.”
Like other nations around the world, the United States has
developed its own definitions regarding terrorism. In fact,
there are a number of domestic definitions of terrorism that
can be found in various federal criminal statutes and
legislation.20 The most recent effort to define terrorism is
18

Serge Schmemann, Man in the News; UN's Candid Reshaper-Kofi Atta Annan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2001, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/13/international/13ANNA.html.
19
Id. The central international treaty dealing with the law of war or
the law of armed conflict is the 1949 Geneva Convention. International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), The Geneva Conventions of 1949,
available at
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/genevaconventions
(2009). The Geneva Conventions are set out in four categories: (1)
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 31; (2) Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; (3) Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 135; and (4) Geneva Convention Relative to the Protections of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. Id.
20
See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. §0.85 (2010) (asserting that there are
numerous Federal statutes that offer slightly different definitions of
terrorism). The Department of Justice defines terrorism as ―the unlawful
use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or
coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in
furtherance of political or social objectives.‖ Id.
(1) the term ―international terrorism‖ means activities
that—
(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life
that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United
States or of any State, or that would be a criminal
violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the
United States or of any State;
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found at § 411 of the Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism (hereinafter “USA/PATRIOT Act”) Act
of 2001,21 which provides definitions for ―terrorist
organization,‖ ―domestic terrorism,‖ and ―international
terrorism.‖22 A terrorist organization is defined as one that is:
(1) Designated by the Secretary of State as a
terrorist organization under the process
established under current law;
(2) Designated by the Secretary of State as a
terrorist
organization
for
immigration
purposes; or
(3) A group of two or more individuals that
commits terrorist activities or plans or
prepares to commit (including locating targets
for) terrorist activities.‖23
International terrorism is set out in the Act as follows:
International terrorism involves violent acts or
acts dangerous to human life that violate the
(B) appear to be intended—
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by
intimidation or coercion; or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and
(C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States, or transcend national boundaries in
terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the
persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or
the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek
asylum
18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2009) (offering a slightly different definition of
international terrorism).
21
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 [USA
PATRIOT ACT], Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
22
Id.
23
Id.
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criminal laws of the United States or any state,
or that would be a criminal violation if
committed within the jurisdiction of the
United States or any state. These acts appear
intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian
population, influence the policy of a
government by intimidation to coercion, or
affect the conduct of a government by
assassination or kidnapping. International
terrorist acts occur outside the United States or
transcend national boundaries in terms of how
terrorists accomplish them, the persons they
appear intended to coerce or intimidate, or the
place in which the perpetrators operate.24
In summary, if the international community cannot even
agree on how to define terrorism, it is highly unlikely that the
United Nations will move very far or fast to develop new
legal foundations to confront the problem head-on. Thus, it
rests on individual democracies to craft the necessary treaties
and agreements to move forward in the fight against
international terrorism.
III. UNITED STATES CIVIL LITIGATION LAW AGAINST
TERRORISM
American law recognizes two major types of legal
activity in the realm of civil liability lawsuits regarding acts
of terrorism. The first relates to so-called ―premises liability‖
lawsuits which are typically brought by victims of an act of
terrorism against an ―affected target‖ of terrorism, e.g., a
business entity. The second category relates to lawsuits
directed against those individuals, groups, or States (or State
agents) that commit, support, or sponsor a terrorist attack.
This discussion concerns the second category of civil
litigation.
Monetary damages associated with civil actions against
terrorists and their sponsors serve as a key ingredient in
24

Id.
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combating international terrorism and fulfill United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1368 (issued in the wake of the
terror attacks of September 11, 2001): ―[T]he international
community [must] redouble their efforts to prevent and
suppress terrorist acts . . . .‖25 Even prior to the coordinated
terror attacks of September 11, 2001, which killed 3,000
people and caused billions of dollars in property loss, the
United States government recognized the threat of
international terrorism and the need to provide solid legal
mechanisms for American terror victims to file private causes
of action against both those who commit international acts of
terror and those who contribute to those attacks, either
directly or indirectly. In addition to providing an avenue for
victims of terror to receive compensation, the United States
also understood that civil litigation, if used effectively, would
certainly serve as a critical and necessary means of deterrence
against terrorist organizations as well as those nations who
sponsor terrorist groups. For this reason, Congress expressly
directed retroactive application of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (hereinafter ―AEDPA‖),
8 U.S. C. § 1189, so that the law applied to any cause of
action arising before or after the enactment of the AEDPA.26
25

S. C. Res. 1368, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001).
―Unequivocally condemns in the strongest terms the horrifying terrorist
attacks which took place on 11 September 2001 in New York,
Washington, D.C. and Pennsylvania and regards such acts, like any act of
international terrorism, as a threat to international peace and security.‖ Id.
at ¶ 1.
26
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1189
(1996).
(1) In general. The Secretary is authorized to designate
an organization as a foreign terrorist organization in
accordance with this subsection if the Secretary finds
that—
(A) the organization is a foreign organization;
(B) the organization engages in terrorist activity (as
defined in section 212(a)(3)(B) [8 USCS
§ 1182(a)(3)(B)]); and
(C) the terrorist activity of the organization
threatens the security of United States nationals or
the national security of the United States.
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In tandem with subsequent federal statutes dealing with
terrorism civil lawsuits, this model ensures that terrorists and
their supporters suffer significant financial punishment which
functions both as a direct deterrence and as a disabling
mechanism—the very core of the intent of punitive damages.
Clearly, in the American justice system, the essence of
punitive damages is to award the plaintiff(s) a significant
money judgment in addition to actual damages against those
defendants who acted with recklessness, intentional malice,
or deceit. The wrongdoer is penalized by means of punitive
damages in order to both deter future wrongdoing and to
make a clear example to others.27 Nowhere is this context
more applicable than in the sphere of curtailing international
terrorism. Paradoxically, however, it is this provision that
presents a stumbling block for other democracies to join as
full partners in any agreements to honor such judgments.
In the United States, civil litigation28 can be brought
against one of three categories of international terrorists and
their sponsors: (1) purely non-State actors, individuals as well
as groups; (2) States that sponsor terrorism, or their agents
(hereinafter ―Flatow Amendment‖);29 or (3) State actors
committing acts of terrorism outside of their official capacity,
so-called non-FSIA (Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act)
defendants.30 Currently, under American jurisprudence, two
main federal statutory frameworks exist: (1) the Flatow
Amendment to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(hereinafter ―FSIA‖), 28 U.S.C. § 1605; and (2) the
Antiterrorism Act (hereinafter ―ATA‖), 18 U.S.C. § 2333.
The so-called Flatow Amendment provides that a foreign
official of a designated State sponsor of terrorism, while
acting within the scope of his office, can be civilly liable in
27

See, e.g., BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 418 (8th ed. 2004).
The use of civil litigation as a deterrent to the proscription of
torture predates terrorism. Acknowledging that the practice of torture
would continue unless deterred, the 1984 case of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
awarded punitive damages of no less than $5,000,000.00 to the father and
sister of Joelito Filartiga, who was tortured to death by Paraguayan
officials. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
29
Judiciary & Judicial Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2008).
30
Id.
28
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an American court for violation of acts contained within the
legislation. Further, as part of the 2008 Defense
Authorization Act,31 Congress made it crystal clear that 1996
FSIA Amendments applied a statutory cause of action against
the actual State that sponsored the terrorist act.32 Similarly,
the ATA allows for private citizens to bring lawsuits for acts
of international terrorism with the added deterrent goal of
making it unprofitable for terrorists to solicit or maintain
financial assets within the United States.33
Added to the FSIA in 1996, the Flatow Amendment is
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605A, creating an exception to
foreign sovereign immunity in civil suits ―in which money
damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury
or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial
killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of
material support or resources [as defined in section 2339A of
Title 18] for such an act if such act or provision of material
support is engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of
such foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her
office, employment, or agency‖34 or other terrorist acts.
Although this exception applies only if the defendant foreign
State was designated as a State sponsor of terrorism at the
time the alleged acts occurred, the issue of punitive damages
remains in all terrorism civil lawsuits. Specifically, §
1605A(c) authorizes the full range of money damages which
―may include economic damages, solatium, pain and
suffering, and punitive damages.‖35 The Flatow Amendment
provides that:
A foreign state that is or was a state sponsor of
31

See National Defense Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 110-181,
§ 1083 (2008).
32
See Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 353 F.3d 1024
(D.C. Cir. 2004). The 2008 Amendment was in response to this ruling in
which the court held that suit could not be brought against the State. Id. at
1036.
33
For an excellent overview of American approaches in the law see
National Security, 43 INT‘L L. 929 (2009).
34
Judiciary & Judicial Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1) (2008).
35
28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c).
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terrorism as described in subsection
(a)(2)(A)(i), and any official, employee, or
agent of that foreign state while acting within
the scope of his or her office, employment, or
agency, shall be liable to (1) a national of the
United
States . . . or
(4)
the
legal
representative of a [United States national] for
personal injury or death caused by acts
described in subsection (a)(1) of that foreign
state, or of an official, employee, or agent of
that foreign state, for which the courts of the
United States may maintain jurisdiction under
this section for money damages [which] may
include economic damages, solatium, pain and
suffering, and punitive damages [emphasis
added].36
In Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran,37 which dealt with
a suicide bomber terror attack on a bus in the Gaza Strip in
1995, the federal court recognized that special compensatory
and punitive damages were legitimate deterrence
considerations since terrorism was directed not just at the
immediate victims, but also at their family members and the
society as a whole. Again, the goal of the terrorist is to ―kill
one and frighten ten thousand.‖38
The malice associated with terrorist attacks
transcends even that of premeditated murder.
The intended audience of a terrorist attack is
not limited to the families of those killed and
wounded or even just Israelis, but in this case,
the American public, for the purpose of
affecting United States government support
for Israel and the peace process. The terrorist‘s
intent is to strike fear not only for one‘s own
36
37

Id.
Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 20–33 (D.D.C.

1998).
38

See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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safety, but also for that of friends and family,
and to manipulate that fear in order to achieve
political objectives. Thus the character of the
wrongful act itself increases the magnitude of
the injury. It thus demands a corresponding
increase in compensation for increased
injury.39
In the context of punitive damages, the matter of
deterrence is a central component because the goal of
punitive damages is to create within the minds of those
organizations and nations that sponsor terror and torture the
realistic expectation of seizure and dissemination of assets in
the form of large monetary damages against them. The court
in Flatow, the case which directly prompted Congress to
create a new statutory cause of action, set out the standard
approach in regard to calculating punitive damages:
Factors which may be considered in
determining an appropriate amount of punitive
damages may be grouped under a few broad
headings, including: (1) the nature of the act
itself, and the extent to which any civilized
society would find that act repugnant; (2) the
circumstances of its planning; (3) Defendants‘
economic status with regard to the ability of
Defendants to pay; and (4) the basis upon
which a Court might determine the amount of
an award reasonably sufficient to deter like
conduct in the future, both by the Defendants
and others.40
Expert testimony in Flatow also led to a standard
calculation in awarding punitive damages in an amount of
three times the amount that the State which sponsors
terrorism (in this case Iran) spends annually on terrorist
39

Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 30 (D.D.C.

1998).
40

Id. at 33.
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activities. In Flatow, this multiplier produced a $300,000,000
punitive damages award. Again, under such a calculation
punitive awards of this magnitude are designed to: (1) deter
State sponsors of terrorism, and (2) affect the ability of such
nations to fund terrorist activities in the future.
In Doe v. Rafael Saravia,41 the court listed a string of
similar cases which awarded amounts ranging from
$4,000,000 to $35,000,000 in punitive and compensatory
damages. The court in Doe noted:
These decisions have awarded damages on the
basis of the following factors: i. Brutality of
the act; ii. Egregiousness of defendant‘s
conduct; iii. Unavailability of criminal
remedy; iv. International condemnation of act;
v. Deterrence of others from committing
similar acts; vi. Provision of redress to
plaintiff, country and world.42
In Acree v. Republic of Iraq, the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia not only reiterated the validity of
punitive damages as a deterrence tool, it saw fit to award
compensatory and punitive damages totaling over
$959,000,000.43 In Acree, 17 American prisoners of war
(hereinafter ―POWs‖) during the 1991 Gulf War and their
immediate family members sued the Republic of Iraq, its
president, and its intelligence service, seeking compensatory
and punitive damages for injuries suffered as a result of
torture inflicted on the POWs while in Iraqi captivity between
January and March 1991. In 2003, the District Court granted
default judgment for the plaintiff POWs. In their complaint,
―the POW plaintiffs described brutal and inhumane acts of
physical and psychological torture suffered during their
captivity, including severe beatings, starvation, mock
41
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executions, dark and unsanitary living conditions, and other
violent and shocking acts.‖44
The POW plaintiffs alleged that the acts of torture set
forth in their complaint constituted ―traditional torts of
assault, battery and intentional infliction of emotional
distress,‖ and requested full compensatory and punitive
damages for each of the 17 POW plaintiffs and their family
members. On July 7, 2003, the court entered final judgment
in favor of the plaintiffs. Based on extensive findings of fact
regarding the specific injuries suffered by each plaintiff, the
federal district court awarded compensatory and punitive
damages to all of the POW plaintiffs and their family
members, totaling just under one billion dollars.
Unlike the FSIA, the ATA does not specify what type of
damages may be awarded. Further, the ATA does not clearly
define the class of potential plaintiffs. Nevertheless, by
allowing the ―estate, survivors, or heirs‖ of a U.S. national
killed by an act of terrorism to sue in federal district court and
to recover treble damages and attorney‘s fees,45 it is certain
that the intent of the law is to maximize the punishment of the
wrongdoer so that it is punitive in nature. In American
jurisprudence, the purpose of allowing for treble damages is
always punitive in nature and designed to ―punish past, and to
deter future, unlawful conduct.‖46 The court used a treble
damages formula in assessing damages against Iran. This
approach is now standard.
In Eisenfeld v. Islamic Republic of Iran,47 a case
involving a 1996 Iranian State-sponsored act of terrorism
carried out by the terror organization Hamas where a bus was
bombed in Jerusalem, the court cited the Flatow punitive
damages approach and awarded the two plaintiff decendents‘
estates a single award of $300,000,000 ($150,000,000
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each).48 In Boim v. Quranic Literacy Institute and Hold Land
Foundation for Relief and Development,49 the parents of a
U.S. citizen murdered in a terror attack in Israel by the
terrorist group Hamas sued several individuals and
organizations for the loss of their son. They were awarded
damages using the treble damages formula.
Civil damages in terrorism cases provide one of the most
effective tools imaginable in deterring international terrorism.
Indeed, the provision of monetary damages against any
wrongdoer along the causal chain of international terrorism
can help drain the swamps where terrorism breeds. Under the
FSIA and ATA, plaintiffs may expect to level judgments in
the tens or hundreds of millions of dollars against those
renegade States who sponsor terrorism. The twin aims of
fully compensating victims and significantly punishing the
financial capabilities of terrorist sponsors form the basis for
these judgments. Under the American viewpoint, the
egregious nature of international terrorism demands that all
courts in all nations assess civil damages at the highest
possible levels. As the court stated in Flatow: ―As terrorism
has achieved the status of almost universal condemnation, as
have slavery, genocide, and piracy, the terrorist is the modern
era‘s hosti humani generis—an enemy of all mankind. . . .‖50
Despite the development of the current American
terrorism jurisprudence, all is not well. The inability of
victims to recover damages once they are awarded judgment
in court stands as a major distorter of justice and deterrence.
In some instances, Iran, the most notorious State-sponsor of
terrorism, has removed or hidden assets from the reaches of
48
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American law.51 In other instances, the executive branch of
the U.S. government has served to block recovery of assets
under the notion that the Executive needs the flexibility to
conduct foreign affairs.52
IV. PUNITIVE DAMAGES V. COMPENSATORY DAMAGES
University of Virginia School of Law international law
expert, Professor John Norton Moore strongly advocates that
all nations adopt a strong legal model for civil lawsuits that
incorporates significant punitive damages: ―It is strongly in
our interest to have every nation on earth copy the 1996 FSIA
amendments.‖53
Nevertheless, Moore recognizes that
punitive damages are not palatable to most civil law nations
and poses a significant hurdle to developing a consensus that
would truly hold renegade nations accountable for acts of
terrorism committed by them or their agents. 54 Adopting an
American-styled deterrence model that not only provides for
citizens to be compensated for acts of terror, but also brings
with it the hammer of punitive damages is simply unrealistic.
If real progress is to be made toward creating a global legal
framework which can act to effectively suppress the scourge
of international terrorism the concept of punitive damages
must be framed within the parameters of compensatory
damages.
51
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In short, even if punitive damages have to be discarded in
any attempt to develop a workable model for other
democracies to honor judgments rendered by fellow
democracies in terror cases, American precedents in setting
damage awards under compensatory concepts would still
produce meaningful and effective remedies. Since legal cases
involving acts of terror have parallels in common law
wrongful death and injury lawsuits, a brief overview of
American judgments in these areas reveals that there is still
significant punch in the compensatory arena. A reasonable
pragmatic approach in dealing with compensatory damage
awards would still act as a deterrent to States that support
terrorism. Although the compensatory judgments are
certainly not large vis a vis punitive damages, a flood of
lawsuits wait hungrily at the door for satisfaction and would
certainly make up for the discrepancy in short order.
Despite the perception that American courts grant
exorbitant awards in wrongful death cases, the amount of
compensatory damages in most instances is both practical and
reasonable. Even in what can be considered high-profile
cases, the awards granted reflect a judicious approach in
terms of just compensation for the wrongs inflicted. Four
examples illustrate this point. First, a 2004 wrongful death
civil lawsuit from a Texas State court dealt with a wrongful
death claim where a wife killed her suspected cheating
husband by intentionally hitting him with her car and then
running the vehicle over his body multiple times. The parents
of the victim sued the woman for wrongful death and
received $1,858,750 each for pecuniary losses, loss of
companionship, and mental anguish.55
Second, in perhaps the most infamous wrongful death suit
in the history of the United States, the verdict against O.J.
Simpson, though totaling $33.5 million, awarded
compensatory damages equaling only $8.5 million. A jury
found that defendant Orenthal James (O.J.) Simpson
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committed these homicides willfully and wrongfully, with
oppression and malice.56
Third, in Rux v. Republic of Sudan, the case of the
surviving family members of American sailors killed in the
2000 al-Qa‘eda terror attack on the U.S.S. Cole, in Yemen, a
Virginia federal judge granted an award just under $8 million
dollars.57 This civil action lawsuit claimed wrongful death,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violations
under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the Death
on the High Seas Act58 against the Republic of Sudan. The
family members claimed that the Republic of Sudan was
liable for damages from the attack of the U.S.S. Cole in the
Port of Aden, Yemen, because it provided material support
and assistance to al- Qa‘eda, the terrorist organization behind
the attack. The compensatory award was split between 33
family members, with the amounts ranging from $471,327 to
$117,418 each.59
The final example returns to the most often cited
American case dealing with compensatory damages, Flatow
v. Islamic Republic of Iran,60 which dealt with a suicide
bomber terror attack on a bus in the Gaza Strip in 1995.
Flatow, and a line of cases following Flatow, set out valuable
considerations associated with the long standing concept of
compensatory damages in common law tort which are
designed to compensate not just the immediate family of the
victims, but also more remote family members. The Flatow
court found that the vicious nature of terrorism inflicts a
unique harm which is reflected in the resulting compensatory
damages.
The malice associated with terrorist attacks
transcends even that of premeditated murder.
The intended audience of a terrorist attack is
not limited to the families of those killed and
56
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wounded or even just Israelis, but in this case,
the American public, for the purpose of
affecting United States government support
for Israel and the peace process. The terrorist‘s
intent is to strike fear not only for one‘s own
safety, but also for that of friends and family,
and to manipulate that fear in order to achieve
political objectives. Thus the character of the
wrongful act itself increases the magnitude of
the injury. It thus demands a corresponding
increase in compensation for increased
injury.61
The victim‘s family in Flatow was allowed to recover
compensatory damages for economic loss, pain and suffering,
and solatium. The court calculated economic damages by
adding the funeral bill of $4,470.00 with the loss of
accretions to the estate in the amount of $1,508,750.00. The
calculation for loss of accretions took into account inflation,
rise in productivity, job advancement, and net earnings.
Furthermore, the court awarded $1,000,000 for the three to
five hours of pain and suffering the victim endured after the
terrorist attack before she died.
The Flatow decision is also noted for its increased award
of solatium damages which account for the additional
suffering caused by the family members of a victim to a
terrorist act. The court noted that ―mental anguish,
bereavement and grief resulting from the fact of decedent‘s
death constitutes the preponderant element of a claim for
solatium.‖62 The court then divided its solatium inquiry into
determining: (1) the mental anguish suffered by the victim‘s
family, and (2) the loss of decedent‘s society and comfort.
Calculations for both of these damage types are fact intensive
and not subject to exact models associated with economic
loss.
Two main factors guided the analysis for both damage
types: (1) the expected duration of the mental anguish, and
61
62
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(2) the nature of the relationship between the claimant and
decedent. Since all acts of terrorism employ unlawful
violence, the anguish of family members is prolonged well
beyond what is experienced for a natural death. In turn, a
more intimate family connection calls for greater levels of
compensation for the victim‘s family member. Again, Flatow
provides a superb standardized rubric for compensatory
damages calculation.
Numerous factors enter into this analysis,
including: strong emotional ties between the
claimant and the decedent; decedent‘s position
in the family birth order relative to the
claimant; the relative maturity or immaturity
of the claimants; whether decedent habitually
provided advice and solace to claimants;
whether the claimant shared interests and
pursuits with decedent; as well as decedent‘s
achievements and plans for the future which
would have affected claimants.63
The inner details of any heir, parent, or sibling‘s
relationship with the deceased may be uncovered to construct
an accurate picture of the loss suffered. Another statement of
similar factors was given for solatium in Kerr v. Islamic
Republic of Iran:
(1) whether the decedent‘s death was sudden
and unexpected; (2) whether the death was
attributable to negligence or malice; (3)
whether the claimants have sought medical
treatment for depression and related disorders
resulting from the decedent‘s death; (4) the
nature (i.e. closeness) of the relationship
between the claimant and the decedent; and
(5) the duration of the claimant‘s mental
anguish in excess of that which would have

63
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been experienced following the decedent‘s
natural death.‖64
Rooted in a common law tort framework, the ATA has no
specific requirement that those recovering be citizens of the
United States themselves (the statute provides no definition
for ―survivors‖ or ―heirs‖), nor does it specify the types of
damages. Nevertheless, in light of legislative history and
developing case law, the 2004 case of Ungar v. Palestinian
Authority, sets the accepted methodology in determining
these matters.65 Yaron Ungar and his wife were killed in a
drive-by shooting by terrorists on June, 9, 1996, in Israel.
Yaron‘s family brought suit under the ATA against multiple
defendants including the Palestinian Authority. The district
court found that Yaron‘s parents and siblings qualified to
bring suit as ―survivors‖ under the wording of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2333(a), since Congress intended to use common law tort
principles to extend civil liability to terrorist acts with the
widest possible effect. The use of the term ―survivors‖
evidences the intent that immediate family members, other
than heirs, may seek compensation for the loss of a loved
one. Indeed, allowing siblings and parents of those killed by
terrorists to recover damages serves as an additional
deterrence factor to terrorism.
In reference to the issue of damages, Ungar held that the
primary purpose of the law was to empower the victims of
terrorism to the fullest extent possible. Accordingly, Ungar
allowed for the full range of damages set out under the FSIA.
Ungar‘s two children (heirs), parents, and siblings were all
awarded damages for loss of society and companionship. The
children also recovered for loss of parental guidance and
parental services which Ungar could no longer provide.
―These services include such tasks as babysitting, feeding,
bathing, doing the laundry, getting them ready for school, and
similar assistance normally performed by a parent for a
64
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child.‖66 Economic damages will ordinarily include loss of
earnings and funeral costs. Similar to Flatow, where the court
considered inflation, rise in productivity, job advancement,
and net earnings in its calculations of lost earnings, the Ungar
family recovered lost earnings subject to Ungar‘s personal
consumption.
Understanding that no rigid formula exists for computing
damages associated with pain and suffering, the Ungar court
heard expert testimony giving a step-by-step analysis of the
drive-by shooting to accurately determine damages for pain
and suffering. The court considered in its calculation the fact
that Ungar suffered painful bullet wounds in his arm and
chest before being killed by a head shot while slumped in his
car seat, as well as the mental pain Ungar experienced at
seeing his wife‘s death shortly before his own. The court
awarded $500,000 for the pain and suffering. In addition,
Ungar‘s family received losses for mental anguish (solatium)
which were calculated in a similar fashion to loss of society.
Ungar‘s children, parents and three siblings received a total
of $38,803,401 in compensatory damages for all the above
mentioned losses.
Jenco v. Islamic Republic of Iran67 provides additional
guidance for appropriate compensatory damages. Father
Lawrence M. Jenco was a Catholic priest working in Beirut,
Lebanon when he was taken hostage by the terrorist
organization Hezbollah.
After a year and a half of
maltreatment he was released. Father Jenco and his family
sued Hizbollah and the government of Iran which funds the
terrorist organization. Father Jenco recovered for torts of
battery, assault, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction
of emotional distress. The court broke with traditional
doctrine when it allowed Father Jenco‘s immediate family to
recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress
although they were not physically present to see the
outrageous and abusive conduct of his captors. The Jenco
court referenced the reasoning of the court in Sutherland v.
66
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The Islamic Republic of Iran, which stated that ―when an
organization takes someone hostage, it is implicitly intending
to cause emotional distress among the members of that
hostage‘s immediate family.‖68 The Jenco court also adopted
the precedent established in Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of
Iran,69 of awarding ten thousand dollars a day to plaintiffs
who were taken hostage. That formula made for a damage
award of $24,540,000 for Jenco.
V. PROPOSING AN INTERNATIONAL PROTOCOL FOR CIVIL
LITIGATION AGAINST TERRORISM
Many of the world‘s civil legal systems differ
substantially from the United States‘ civil legal system.70
Nevertheless, in the realm of compensating victims of
terrorism, the American approach has much to contribute. Of
paramount importance, the American perspective centers on
the desire to provide solid legal mechanisms for American
terror victims to file private causes of action against both
those who commit international acts of terror and those States
who contribute to or stand behind those attacks. As briefly
outlined above, in addition to standard tort remedies, the
United States has codified traditional tort causes of action in
terms of fixed legislation.
The next step in the process of developing civil litigation
as a viable tool to fight terror is to propose for adoption a
United Nations protocol that will allow State Parties to honor
damage awards in terrorism civil litigation suits rendered by
other State Parties. In his 2010 book, Legal Issues in the
Struggle Against Terror, John Norton Moore offers such a
draft protocol. Disregarding the punitive damages set out in
American legislation, Moore provides the following at
proposed Article 11:
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States Parties to this Protocol undertake to
honor in their national legal systems
judgments rendered by other States Parties
under actions established consistent with this
Protocol provided;
 A judge of the honoring State Party
reviews the foreign judgment and
determines that the judgment was fair and
consistent with due process of law;
 No State Party is required to honor
damage awards, such as those for punitive
damages, which are inconsistent with its
own national law; and
 No attachment or execution shall be
permitted against facilities protected by
diplomatic or counselor immunity, military
assets, or assets held by national central
banks [emphasis added].71
VI. CONCLUSION
The so-called War on Terror requires the use of all
available legal tools and the application of the power of the
civil justice system represents a vastly underutilized potential
of great impact. Understanding that international tort law has
been around for centuries, it is imperative that the
democracies of the international community take direct steps
to capitalize on this essential legal tool as a weapon against
terrorist States. Totalitarian regimes like Iran and North
Korea are the ones that are guilty of supporting terrorism and
have too long been able to conceal huge financial assets
within the borders and reach of many of the world‘s
democratic States.
Chief among the arguments against adopting an
American-style civil action framework is the concern over
71
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punitive damages. Since punitive damages are generally not
available in civil law systems and are very controversial in
international practice, a proposed international protocol must
limit damages to compensatory only. As discussed under
Section V of this article, the use of compensatory damages
would still deliver a significant blow to States that sponsor
terrorism, particularly if the full range of compensation is
provided.
A new United Nations convention on civil causes of
action against States that sponsor terrorists would have as its
key component an obligation on State parties to enact
legislation to permit civil suits and honor the judgments
issued by other States. Not only would the civil litigation
serve as permanent record of the terror act established by a
competent court— an official record of condemnation—the
damages awarded would serve as deterrence to the
machinations of the State that sponsored the terrorism.
At the end of the day, civil lawsuits are also intended to
bring public shame within the international community to
those nations who sponsor acts of terror. Since terrorist acts
have long been criminalized in every democratically-based
legal system as well as in numerous United Nations
sponsored conventions,72 it is essential that all democracies
take the next step and develop a legal framework where the
terror judgments of other democracies are given reciprocity.
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